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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper estimates the effect of the Investors in People Standard on training while 
controlling for self-selection. Our results show that high-training workplaces self-select 
into Investors in People and question the value of the Standard for promoting training. 
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1. Introduction 
The centrality of human capital to economic performance features in the opening paragraphs of 
Smith (1776, I.I.3), and training has long been regarded as a crucial determinant of human 
capital development and crucial for understanding the competitive strengths of national 
economies (e.g., Mincer, 1958; Dustmann et al, 2008: p. 1). Interest in public programs claiming 
to enhance training is understandable in this context. 
This paper estimates the effect of the Investors in People Standard (the Standard) on training 
while controlling for self-selection. The Standard offers a benchmark for training and 
development practices and has been widely adopted in the UK. Approximately 32 percent of 
workplaces are accredited (Cully et al, 1999), covering 29 percent of employment (Hoque et al, 
2005). No previous work has explored the impact of workplace self-selection into the Standard. 
We employ a Heckman two-step approach to treatment effects (Heckman, 1976) to reassesses 
the effect of the Standard on training outcomes.  
2. Literature 
The Standard is a market-based approach to improving training. Companies decide whether or 
not to pursue certification, and those that satisfy independent assessors can use the Investors in 
People logo in their correspondence, advertising, etc. 
Organizations (and the HR professionals within them) may accrue benefits from the Standard 
beyond increased training levels. These include facilitating differentiation strategies in product 
and input markets, and the building of prestige in professional networks (e.g., Bell et al, 2002; 
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Hoque et al, 2005). The literature on the effects of the Standard on training came under particular 
scrutiny with the publication of Hoque (2003), and a number of authors suggest that the Standard 
has had little impact on training behaviors (e.g., Douglas et al, 1999). Hoque’s (2003, p. 568) 
conclusion that the Standard has, “come to represent little more than a ‘plaque on the wall’” in 
some accredited organizations is based on the existence of a substantial number of accredited 
workplaces that do not deliver various training practices. Hoque interprets this as evidence of the 
ineffectiveness of the Standard for producing long-lasting change, and as behavior consistent 
with instrumental engagement of companies with the Standard (p. 566) despite finding a positive 
effect of the Standard on training in British workplaces.  
The business need for the Standard may be the accreditation itself in some workplaces. 
Training programs may also suffer from an ‘atrophy effect’ (Hoque, 2003) as well as a bias 
towards ‘hard’ measures which may lead to reductions in training budgets (Down and Smith, 
1998). If training budgets are falling and training is focused narrowly on business need then the 
net effect of the Standard may be to reduce training in treated workplaces, and two-tailed tests 
are warranted for assessing the effect of the Standard.  
The existence of accredited workplaces that behave counter to the suggestions of the 
Standard is worthy of further investigation. We focus on the incidence and interaction of 
Investors in People accreditation with the levels of training delivered, the presence of training 
discussions between line managers and employees, and the extent to which employees feel 
encouraged to develop their skills. We conceptualize the Standard as a treatment and view 
workplaces as choosing whether or not to receive treatment. This approach avoids defining the 
value of the Standard only by its failures.  
3. Hypotheses 
  3 
Previous research leads us to specify six hypotheses associated with each training outcome. 
These hypotheses come in two sets of three mutually-exclusive hypotheses: the first set 
regarding the effect of the Standard on training activity; and the second set regarding the nature 
of any self-selection by workplaces into the Standard.  
Examination of the coefficient on the Investors in People dummy variable in our effect 
equation must support one of the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a-c: Workplaces accredited by Investors in People are more/just as/less likely to 
engage in training activities than other workplaces.  
Each hypothesis has some support in the literature. Hypothesis 1a is consistent with the stated 
aims of the Standard. Hypothesis 1c is consistent with an atrophy effect suggested by Hoque 
(2003, p. 566). This hypothesis is also consistent with the reduction of training budgets identified 
by Down and Smith (1998).  
We also identify three hypotheses referring to the expected significance and sign of the 
inverse Mills ratio in the effect equations. These capture any self-selection into the Investors in 
People treatment. These hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 2a-c: Workplaces that are less likely to engage in training activities than other 
workplaces are more/just as/less likely to put themselves forward for 
accreditation than other workplaces. 
Hypothesis 2a is consistent with the Standard facilitating change. The appeal of the Standard 
as a change management tool might be stronger for workplaces undertaking large changes to 
practices. Thus we might expect firms that are likely to go for the ‘treatment’ are those who 
would otherwise be unlikely to engage in training. Hypothesis 2a is also consistent with the use 
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of the Standard as a means of differentiation. Those firms who might otherwise be expected to 
provide relatively little training might find that accreditation sends a stronger signal to the 
marketplace. Either explanation could generate a significant negative coefficient associated with 
the inverse Mills ratio in the effect equation. Hypothesis 2b reflects the possibility that there is 
no meaningful self-selection into the Investors in People treatment, and Hypothesis 2c suggests 
instrumentality in the pursuit of the Standard. Workplaces that are pre-disposed to activities 
encouraged by the Standard might incur lower costs during accreditation as they already adhere 
to most criteria. A significant positive coefficient associated with the inverse Mills ratio would 
support Hypothesis 2c. 
4. Data 
We use data from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (1998). Cross-sectional data was 
collected via face-to-face interviews with a main management respondent and by a self-
completion questionnaire distributed to a random selection of employees in a representative 
sample of UK workplaces.  
4.1 Variables 
The Heckman approach requires the first stage estimation of the treatment equation followed by 
the estimation of an effect equation including the inverse Mill’s ratio calculated from the 
treatment equation. The effect equations examine the incidence and extent of training activities 
with three questions to employees: 
 During the last 12 months, how much training have you had, either paid for or organized 
by your employer? 
  5 
 During the last 12 months, have you discussed your training needs with your 
supervisor/line manager? 
 Are people working here encouraged to develop their skills?  
 
The independent variables in the treatment equation include sets of dummy variables 
capturing the job role of the managerial respondent as well as important workplace 
characteristics. The effect equations include all of the independent variables from the treatment 
equation with the exception of the indicator describing the role of the managerial respondent. 
This exclusion is justified on the basis that HR specialists would be better-informed about 
accreditation status and may also be subject to social desirability associated with the prestige of 
the Standard in their professional networks. The effect equations also include an Investors in 
People dummy variable, the inverse Mills ratio calculated using the treatment equation, and a 
range of employee demographics. 
5. Results 
Table I examines the impact of the Standard on training. The results of the Heckman approach 
and the dummy variable approach are presented side-by-side for comparison. Employee reports 
of the amount of training received are presented as models 1-2. Employee reports of discussions 
about training are presented as models 3-4. Models 5-6 summarize the extent to which 
employees report that they and their colleagues are encouraged to develop their skills. In all 
cases, the inverse Mills ratio is positive and significant at conventional levels. This indicates self-
selection into the Standard, and that models 1, 3 and 5 should be preferred.  
The positive signs of the coefficients associated with the inverse Mills ratios are consistent 
with hypothesis 2c. Workplaces that are less likely to engage in training are less likely to seek 
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the Standard. Selection bias of this type should lead a simple dummy variable approach to 
overestimate the treatment effect, and models 2, 4 and 6 display this pattern. The bias is strong 
enough to reverse the sign of the treatment effects. The effect of the Standard on employee-
reported training levels is negative, though this estimate is insignificant. The effect of the 
Standard on training discussions is negative and significant at the five-percent level. The effect 
of the Standard on the amount of encouragement to develop skills reported by employees is 
negative and significant at the one-percent level. This evidence supports hypothesis 1c.  
6. Conclusion 
Predisposed workplaces are more likely to put themselves forward for the Standard. After 
controlling for self-selection, we see no evidence that the Standard improves training. Our 
evidence suggests that employees receive approximately the same amount of off-the-job training 
as would be expected in the absence of the Standard, and on-the-job training (line manager 
discussions and encouragement) are lower in the presence of the Standard. This is consistent 
with a more ‘top down’ approach to training. It is also consistent with a focus on ‘hard’ aspects 
of training that can be easily evaluated by external assessors. These results are provocative, 
particularly given moves to pilot and/or introduce the Standard in other countries (Hoque et al, 
2005).  
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TABLE I 
Examination of effects of the Standard on training. Compares the Heckman and dummy 
variable approaches. Coefficients calculated using WERS98 employee weights. Standard 
errors corrected for choice-based sampling and reported in parentheses. Models control 
for workplace size and employee characteristics. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Amount of training 
received 
Discussions in last 
12 months with 
managers about 
training 
Encouragement to 
develop  skills 
Investors in People -0.170 0.156*** -0.284* 0.270*** -0.502*** 0.220*** 
 (0.153) (0.023) (0.144) (0.020) (0.148) (0.023) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.195* - 0.331*** - 0.432*** - 
 (0.093) - (0.086) - (0.089) - 
       
 Constant  0.192 0.085 -0.455*** -0.638*** 2.491*** 2.250*** 
 (0.130) (0.119) (0.116) (0.106) (0.126) (0.116) 
       
Observations 21078 21078 21087 21087 20615 20615 
Method 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Probit Probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
Approach to 
estimating 
effectiveness of 
treatment 
Two-step 
Dummy 
variable 
Two-step 
Dummy 
variable 
Two-step 
Dummy 
variable 
 
* = significant at the 0.05 level,  
** = significant at the 0.01 level 
*** = significant at the 0.001 level 
 
